Is it possible to talk of public opinion existing in the Third Reich, and if so, how did the nazi regime attempt to influence such opinion by means of propaganda? What are the key themes associated with propaganda? This article will argue that the concept of a 'national' or 'people's' community (Volksgemeinschaft) was a key element in the 'revolutionary' aims of the nazi regime, and illustrates the remarkably ambitious nature of its propaganda.1
Propaganda presented an image of society that had successfully manufactured a 'national community' by transcending social and class divisiveness through a new ethnic unity based on 'true' German values. But was there a gap between the claims trumpeted in nazi propaganda and social reality? Recent works have suggested that there was, and indeed that the gap between social myth and social reality in the Third Reich grew ever wider. This article will reappraise the effectiveness (or otherwise) of Volksgemeinschaft by analysing the response from two sections of the community -the industrial working class and German youth.
Propaganda played an important part in mobilizing support for the NSDAP in opposition and maintaining the party once in power. But propaganda alone could not have sustained the Nazi Party and its ideology over a period of 12 years. There is now considerable evidence to suggest that nazi policies and propaganda reflected many of the aspirations of large sections of the population.2 Propaganda in nazi Germany was not, as is often believed, a 'catch-all' This article was first delivered in 2002 as a Trevelyan Lecture at the University of Cambridge.
to large masses of people and attempt to move them to a uniformity of opinion and action. Nevertheless, the nazis also understood that propaganda is of little value in isolation. To some extent this explains why Goebbels impressed on all his staff at the Ministry of Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda the imperative necessity constantly to gauge public moods. Goebbels therefore regularly received (as did all the ruling elites) extraordinarily detailed reports from the Secret Police (SD) about the mood of the people and would frequently quote these in his diary. Hitler, too, was familiar with these reports and his recorded determination to avoid increasing food prices at all costs for fear that this would undermine the regime's popularity suggests a political sensitivity to public opinion. To assure themselves of continued popular support was an unwavering concern of the nazi leadership, and of Hitler and Goebbels in particular.
To this end, a number of different agencies were engaged in assessing the state of public opinion and the factors affecting public morale. The SD, the Gestapo, the Party, local government authorities and the judiciary all made it their business to gauge the mood and morale of the people. Their reports were based on information received from agents throughout the Reich who reported on their conversations with Party members or on conversations they had overheard. It has been estimated that by 1939 the SD alone had some 3000 full-time officials and some 50,000 part-time agents. 4 For some years now, two key sources have been exploited more fully in an attempt to understand the regime's problems of political control and mobilization. The first is the various reports on civilian morale and public opinion conducted from 1939 by the Security Service (Sicherheitsdienst or SD) of the SS and later, under cover, by the RMVP (Propaganda Ministry) itself. The second is the Deutschland-Berichte (Sopade) published in 1980, containing underground reports from the Social Democratic Party's contacts, both those stationed in Germany and those travelling through it from outside, who passed on their observations in the form of lengthy monthly reports to the SPD headquarters in exile. These reports, which cover the period 1934-40, encompass every conceivable topic but are particularly concerned with popular attitudes to the regime. Although both sources have their drawbacks and need to be used critically, they have greatly contributed to our understanding of questions relating to the popular base of nazism and specifically to the ongoing debate about the 'power' or otherwise of nazi propaganda. Both of these sources will be referred to in the following analysis.5 Thus, it would be an over-simplification to think of the German public as a to large masses of people and attempt to move them to a uniformity of opinion and action. Nevertheless, the nazis also understood that propaganda is of little value in isolation. To some extent this explains why Goebbels impressed on all his staff at the Ministry of Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda the imperative necessity constantly to gauge public moods. Goebbels therefore regularly received (as did all the ruling elites) extraordinarily detailed reports from the Secret Police (SD) about the mood of the people and would frequently quote these in his diary. Hitler, too, was familiar with these reports and his recorded determination to avoid increasing food prices at all costs for fear that this would undermine the regime's popularity suggests a political sensitivity to public opinion. To assure themselves of continued popular support was an unwavering concern of the nazi leadership, and of Hitler and Goebbels in particular.
To this end, a number of different agencies were engaged in assessing the state of public opinion and the factors affecting public morale. The SD, the Gestapo, the Party, local government authorities and the judiciary all made it their business to gauge the mood and morale of the people. Their reports were based on information received from agents throughout the Reich who reported on their conversations with Party members or on conversations they had overheard. It has been estimated that by 1939 the SD alone had some 3000 full-time officials and some 50,000 part-time agents. 4 For some years now, two key sources have been exploited more fully in an attempt to understand the regime's problems of political control and mobilization. The first is the various reports on civilian morale and public opinion conducted from 1939 by the Security Service (Sicherheitsdienst or SD) of the SS and later, under cover, by the RMVP (Propaganda Ministry) itself. The second is the Deutschland-Berichte (Sopade) published in 1980, containing underground reports from the Social Democratic Party's contacts, both those stationed in Germany and those travelling through it from outside, who passed on their observations in the form of lengthy monthly reports to the SPD headquarters in exile. These reports, which cover the period 1934-40, encompass every conceivable topic but are particularly concerned with popular attitudes to the regime. Although both sources have their drawbacks and need to be used critically, they have greatly contributed to our understanding of questions relating to the popular base of nazism and specifically to the ongoing debate about the 'power' or otherwise of nazi propaganda. Both of these sources will be referred to in the following analysis.5 Thus, it would be an over-simplification to think of the German public as a tabula rasa, upon which the regime drew whatever picture it wished. In any political system policy must be explained, and the public must either be convinced of the efficacy of government decisions or at least remain indifferent to them. Nazi Germany was no exception, and as with any other political system, public opinion and propaganda remained inexorably linked. That is not to say that all major decisions taken in the Third Reich were influenced by public opinion. Such a statement is clearly absurd; it is rather the case that decision-making and the propaganda justifying policy were conditioned by an awareness of how the public already felt about certain issues. Therefore the 'success' or 'failure' of propaganda was due not simply to the resources and skill of the Propaganda Ministry and its ability (or otherwise) to co-ordinate its campaigns, but it also depended on the prevailing opinions and prejudices of the German public. Too often in the past historians have been concerned only with the organizational techniques of nazi propaganda and not with how it was received by the population, the assumption being, that simply because propaganda played such a disproportionate role in the Third Reich, by implication it must have been highly effective. Clearly Goebbels believed this, but the historian needs to be more sceptical. The aim of this article is to provide a balanced picture between the different reactions of the public to propaganda in the context of the declared aims of that propaganda and the manner in which it was disseminated. By breaking down the aims of nazi propaganda into specific themes it is possible to make an informed assessment of the differentiated reactions of the public to various leitmotivs. As a general statement, it is fair to say that propaganda tended to be more effective when it was reinforcing existing values and prejudices than when it was attempting to manufacture a new value system, or, indeed, when it was encountering some resistance.6 This is an obvious point, but giving greater weight to a scheme of differentiation confirms yet again that the nazi state was no monolith but a mosaic of conflicting authorities and affinities. The nazis saw their Machtergreifung (seizure of power) as more than simply a change of government: it represented the start of a revolution which would transform German society in accordance with their ideology. The socalled nazi revolution was essentially compounded of three elements. First, the nazis utilized the legal authority of the state and its machinery to legitimize their control over the civil service, police and the armed forces. All those who were unwilling to submit to this new authority were either dismissed or liquidated. Second, there was the widespread use made of terror and coercion in the absence of law and order that allowed nazi storm-troopers to seize persons and property at will. The pervasive fear of violence should not be underestimated for it undoubtedly inhibited the forces of opposition. The menace of violence, was, to some extent, counter-balanced by the positive image of nazi society presented in the mass media on an unprecedented scale. Propaganda is tabula rasa, upon which the regime drew whatever picture it wished. In any political system policy must be explained, and the public must either be convinced of the efficacy of government decisions or at least remain indifferent to them. Nazi Germany was no exception, and as with any other political system, public opinion and propaganda remained inexorably linked. That is not to say that all major decisions taken in the Third Reich were influenced by public opinion. Such a statement is clearly absurd; it is rather the case that decision-making and the propaganda justifying policy were conditioned by an awareness of how the public already felt about certain issues. Therefore the 'success' or 'failure' of propaganda was due not simply to the resources and skill of the Propaganda Ministry and its ability (or otherwise) to co-ordinate its campaigns, but it also depended on the prevailing opinions and prejudices of the German public. Too often in the past historians have been concerned only with the organizational techniques of nazi propaganda and not with how it was received by the population, the assumption being, that simply because propaganda played such a disproportionate role in the Third Reich, by implication it must have been highly effective. Clearly Goebbels believed this, but the historian needs to be more sceptical. The aim of this article is to provide a balanced picture between the different reactions of the public to propaganda in the context of the declared aims of that propaganda and the manner in which it was disseminated. By breaking down the aims of nazi propaganda into specific themes it is possible to make an informed assessment of the differentiated reactions of the public to various leitmotivs. As a general statement, it is fair to say that propaganda tended to be more effective when it was reinforcing existing values and prejudices than when it was attempting to manufacture a new value system, or, indeed, when it was encountering some resistance.6 This is an obvious point, but giving greater weight to a scheme of differentiation confirms yet again that the nazi state was no monolith but a mosaic of conflicting authorities and affinities.
The nazis saw their Machtergreifung (seizure of power) as more than simply a change of government: it represented the start of a revolution which would transform German society in accordance with their ideology. The socalled nazi revolution was essentially compounded of three elements. First, the nazis utilized the legal authority of the state and its machinery to legitimize their control over the civil service, police and the armed forces. All those who were unwilling to submit to this new authority were either dismissed or liquidated. Second, there was the widespread use made of terror and coercion in the absence of law and order that allowed nazi storm-troopers to seize persons and property at will. The pervasive fear of violence should not be underestimated for it undoubtedly inhibited the forces of opposition. The menace of violence, was, to some extent, counter-balanced by the positive image of nazi society presented in the mass media on an unprecedented scale. Propaganda is thus the third element. A society that was still suffering from a deep sense of national humiliation, and weakened by inflation, economic depression and mass unemployment, was perhaps not surprisingly attracted to a National Socialist revival that proclaimed that it could integrate disparate elements under the banner of national rebirth for Germany.
The 'revolutionary' aims of the nazi regime highlight the remarkably ambitious nature of its propaganda. From the moment that the Ministry of Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda was established it set itself the task of reeducating the population for a new society based on National Socialist values. (Shortly after his appointment, Goebbels defined the task of his new Ministry as 'achieving a mobilization of mind and spirit in Germany'.) Although nazism is often thought of as a temporary aberration in the history of a nation, it was, in fact, based upon various strands of intellectual thought that go back at least a century. This was the volkisch doctrine, which was essentially a product of late eighteenth-century romanticism.7 The four major themes that recur in nazi propaganda during this period reflect the roots and antecedents of volkisch thought: 1) appeal to national unity based upon the principle: 'The community before the individual' (Volksgemeinschaft); 2) the need for racial purity; 3) a hatred of enemies which increasingly centred on Jews and Bolsheviks, and 4) charismatic leadership (Fiihrerprinzip). Both the original doctrine and the manner in which it was disseminated by nazi propaganda led inexorably to the mobilization of the German people for a future war. Once in war, these propaganda aims could then be extended in order to maintain the fighting morale of the military and civil population.8
The following analysis will be confined to the first theme (Volksgemeinschaft) and to the period leading up to the war. The central goal of nazi propaganda was radically to restructure German society so that the prevailing class, religious and sectional loyalties would be replaced by a new heightened national awareness. A considerable degree of mysticism was involved in the displacement of such deeply-held, yet conflicting values, by means of a 'national' or 'people's' community (Volksgemeinschaft). This desire for unity drew its strength from an idealized past rather than from the present. In an age of industrialization and class conflict, man (it was argued), had to transform his feeling of alienation into one of belonging to a 'pure' community, or Volk. In modern times, this notion can be traced back to the Burgfrieden, or the myth of the 'spirit of August 1914' when the Kaiser declared: 'I recognize no parties, but only Germans.' By ending domestic political strife in the name of the thus the third element. A society that was still suffering from a deep sense of national humiliation, and weakened by inflation, economic depression and mass unemployment, was perhaps not surprisingly attracted to a National Socialist revival that proclaimed that it could integrate disparate elements under the banner of national rebirth for Germany.
The following analysis will be confined to the first theme (Volksgemeinschaft) and to the period leading up to the war. The central goal of nazi propaganda was radically to restructure German society so that the prevailing class, religious and sectional loyalties would be replaced by a new heightened national awareness. A considerable degree of mysticism was involved in the displacement of such deeply-held, yet conflicting values, by means of a 'national' or 'people's' community (Volksgemeinschaft). This desire for unity drew its strength from an idealized past rather than from the present. In an age of industrialization and class conflict, man (it was argued), had to transform his feeling of alienation into one of belonging to a 'pure' community, or Volk. In modern times, this notion can be traced back to the Burgfrieden, or the myth of the 'spirit of August 1914' when the Kaiser declared: 'I recognize no parties, but only Germans.' By ending domestic political strife in the name of the Burgfrieden the nation was apparently united behind the banner of a fullyjustified war of self-defence. In August 1914 it seemed that the war had created a new sense of solidarity in which class antagonisms were transcended by some entirely fictitious 'national community'. The Burgfrieden could not, however, survive a long war, just as the reconciliation of class tensions was dependent on a swift military victory.9 In reality, the superficial harmony of 1914 was a far cry from the Volksgemeinschaft invoked by the nazis. Nevertheless, the nationalist fervour of 1914, the spirit of a united nation ready and eager for a justifiable war, remained a potent force for the German Right throughout the interwar period and appeared to have found fruition in the 'fighting community' of 1933. The NSDAP overcame the potential divisions between nationalism and socialism which had polarized Weimar politics by coupling notions of Volk (ethnic people) with Gemeinschaft (community) into a homogeneous and harmonious 'national community'. The concept was defined by those excluded -largely on racial grounds -but also included 'shirkers' and 'spongers' not prepared to make the necessary individual sacrifices.
In order to manufacture a consensus where one did not previously exist, the nazi propaganda machine would constantly urge the population to put 'the community before the individual' (Gemeinnutz vor Eigennutz) and to place their faith in slogans like 'One People! One Reich! One Fiihrer!' To this end, the political function of propaganda was to co-ordinate the political will of the nation with the aims of the state -or if this proved impossible with certain groups (for example, sections of the industrial working class and Bavarian Catholics), to establish at least passive acquiescence. Propaganda was intended to be the active force cementing the 'national community' together, and the mass media -indeed art in general -would be used to instruct the people about the government's activities and why it required total support for the National Socialist state. Fundamental in the propaganda presentation was the attempt to forge an awareness of the notion of 'experience' (Erlebnis) as the spiritual bond that cemented individuals to this new all-embracing ethnic community. The conscious experience of 'inclusion' as a comrade of the community (as opposed to being an 'outsider') was a critical part of the pseudoreligious vision of a 'national awakening'. In the years leading up to the warpartly as an antidote to the increasing use of coercion and for the subsequent loss of liberty -propaganda eulogized the achievements of the regime. The press, radio, newsreels and film documentaries concentrated on the more prominent schemes: the impact of nazi welfare services such as the National- Burgfrieden the nation was apparently united behind the banner of a fullyjustified war of self-defence. In August 1914 it seemed that the war had created a new sense of solidarity in which class antagonisms were transcended by some entirely fictitious 'national community'. The Burgfrieden could not, however, survive a long war, just as the reconciliation of class tensions was dependent on a swift military victory.9 In reality, the superficial harmony of 1914 was a far cry from the Volksgemeinschaft invoked by the nazis. Nevertheless, the nationalist fervour of 1914, the spirit of a united nation ready and eager for a justifiable war, remained a potent force for the German Right throughout the interwar period and appeared to have found fruition in the 'fighting community' of 1933. The NSDAP overcame the potential divisions between nationalism and socialism which had polarized Weimar politics by coupling notions of Volk (ethnic people) with Gemeinschaft (community) into a homogeneous and harmonious 'national community'. The concept was defined by those excluded -largely on racial grounds -but also included 'shirkers' and 'spongers' not prepared to make the necessary individual sacrifices.
In order to manufacture a consensus where one did not previously exist, the nazi propaganda machine would constantly urge the population to put 'the community before the individual' (Gemeinnutz vor Eigennutz) and to place their faith in slogans like 'One People! One Reich! One Fiihrer!' To this end, the political function of propaganda was to co-ordinate the political will of the nation with the aims of the state -or if this proved impossible with certain groups (for example, sections of the industrial working class and Bavarian Catholics), to establish at least passive acquiescence. Propaganda was intended to be the active force cementing the 'national community' together, and the mass media -indeed art in general -would be used to instruct the people about the government's activities and why it required total support for the National Socialist state. Fundamental in the propaganda presentation was the attempt to forge an awareness of the notion of 'experience' (Erlebnis) as the spiritual bond that cemented individuals to this new all-embracing ethnic community. The conscious experience of 'inclusion' as a comrade of the community (as opposed to being an 'outsider') was a critical part of the pseudoreligious vision of a 'national awakening'. In the years leading up to the warpartly as an antidote to the increasing use of coercion and for the subsequent loss of liberty -propaganda eulogized the achievements of the regime. The press, radio, newsreels and film documentaries concentrated on the more prominent schemes: the impact of nazi welfare services such as the National- To further demonstrate the Third Reich's esteem for its working population, the press, under the rubric 'Workers of the head and hand' (Arbeiter der Stirn und der Faust), would celebrate the 'nobility of hard work' (Adel der schweren Arbeit), when 'unfashionable' workers such as rubbish collectors would be interviewed in a positive way. Posters and photographs showed happy Volksgenossen ('comrades of the people', a term the nazis invented to replace 'citizen') -both blue-and whitecollar workers -sharing an Eintopf (one-pot meal) in a public display of solidarity. The whole notion of Volksgemeinschaft implied that every 'pure' German had some claim to equality, regardless of their social background or occupational position. This sometimes rested uneasily with other notions like Leistungsgemeinschaft ('community based upon achievement') which inferred that equality of status was to extend to equality of opportunity. DAF and the press were only too eager to extol the virtues of merit, highlighting workers who had advanced from humble beginnings. 'The worker is even more aware', a functionary of the Labour Front announced on the sixth anniversary of Hitler's appointment as Chancellor, 'that he has the opportunity to reach the highest levels in his plant commensurate with his merit.'13 Indeed, despite the heavily-regulated labour market, workers still seized opportunities offered by the new structures to manoeuvre for new jobs and personal advancement.
By assimilating workers into first the 'factory community' and then the 'national community', the Labour Front was able to boast that it had successfully overcome both the alienation and exploitation felt by many modern industrial workers and at the same time provided an opportunity for advancement based on performance and not social background. DAF's problem, however, was that in view of the priority of concentrating the nation's resources in rearmament, strict limits were imposed on wage increases, which would have been the obvious way of attempting to win (or bribe) the support of the working class.
Hitler's war plans for full mobilization and rearmament (described succinctly by Jeremy Noakes as 'pursuing a Blitzkrieg strategy in the military sphere, wherever possible, but a total war strategy in the economic sphere') had, by 13 By assimilating workers into first the 'factory community' and then the 'national community', the Labour Front was able to boast that it had successfully overcome both the alienation and exploitation felt by many modern industrial workers and at the same time provided an opportunity for advancement based on performance and not social background. DAF's problem, however, was that in view of the priority of concentrating the nation's resources in rearmament, strict limits were imposed on wage increases, which would have been the obvious way of attempting to win (or bribe) the support of the working class.
Hitler's war plans for full mobilization and rearmament (described succinctly by Jeremy Noakes as 'pursuing a Blitzkrieg strategy in the military sphere, wherever possible, but a total war strategy in the economic sphere') had, by 
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Welch: Nazi Propaganda and the Volksgemeinschaft Welch: Nazi Propaganda and the Volksgemeinschaft 1938, led to reductions in civilian consumption, rationing, and shortages.14 There was no question that workers would be given butter before guns or indeed that the government had any intention of allowing discontent to change their policies. A secret memorandum from the British embassy in Berlin suggested that Hitler was aware of workers' feelings but remained determined to divert 'surplus earnings' away from 'a demand for consumable goods'.15 Nazi propaganda had a dual role to play here by persuading the population that short-term sacrifices were necessary to guarantee future prosperity, and to publicize, as a means of compensation, the measures being introduced by the regime. 1938, led to reductions in civilian consumption, rationing, and shortages.14 There was no question that workers would be given butter before guns or indeed that the government had any intention of allowing discontent to change their policies. A secret memorandum from the British embassy in Berlin suggested that Hitler was aware of workers' feelings but remained determined to divert 'surplus earnings' away from 'a demand for consumable goods'.15 Nazi propaganda had a dual role to play here by persuading the population that short-term sacrifices were necessary to guarantee future prosperity, and to publicize, as a means of compensation, the measures being introduced by the regime. 
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Welch: Nazi Propaganda and the Volksgemeinschaft Welch: Nazi Propaganda and the Volksgemeinschaft an unmitigated failure among industrial workers. Ian Kershaw, in his detailed analysis of Bavaria, has persuasively argued that the 'national community' idea had little impact on changing behavioural patterns which continued to be determined by material considerations.19 But historians like Mason and Kershaw may be giving too much weight to the claims that the nazis themselves made about their propaganda successes. For while 'national community' propaganda did not achieve its 'revolutionary' goal of destroying class and religious loyalties, there is evidence to suggest that it did have some success (by default, in many instances) in creating a new heightened national awareness, and that this was in itself sufficient to secure for the regime a considerable degree of stability and social integration. Many sections of the community, particularly the petty bourgeoisie and those who were formerly unemployed, viewed Volksgemeinschaft not necessarily in terms of a radical restructuring of society involving fundamental social change, but more as an acceptable insurance policy against the alternative, Marxist-Leninism -or as an opportunity for self-advancement. According to Alf Liidtke, 'The vast majority of industrial workers tried to pursue their immediate interests by obtaining jobs and earning higher wages.'20 Workers quickly realized that the best opportunities for personal aggrandizement occurred when they could demonstrate how effectively they were 'working towards the "national community"'.
Reports from the Sopade, the Social Democrats' exile organization, reveal a mixed response to community propaganda and the nazis' social welfare measures. Workers were clearly aware of the many contradictions that existed. Reports show that social facilities like factory sports fields and swimming baths offered by DAF had some impact on working-class perceptions of the regime, yet at the same time workers complained that very often they were 'compelled to build these facilities in their spare time without pay'.21 The 'Beauty of Labour' was seen by many as simply a continuation of paternalistic German business practices and the vogue of the 1920s to increase productivity through modern 'scientific management' techniques. Similarly, for many workers, increased real wages could only be earned through large amounts of an unmitigated failure among industrial workers. Ian Kershaw, in his detailed analysis of Bavaria, has persuasively argued that the 'national community' idea had little impact on changing behavioural patterns which continued to be determined by material considerations.19 But historians like Mason and Kershaw may be giving too much weight to the claims that the nazis themselves made about their propaganda successes. For while 'national community' propaganda did not achieve its 'revolutionary' goal of destroying class and religious loyalties, there is evidence to suggest that it did have some success (by default, in many instances) in creating a new heightened national awareness, and that this was in itself sufficient to secure for the regime a considerable degree of stability and social integration. Many sections of the community, particularly the petty bourgeoisie and those who were formerly unemployed, viewed Volksgemeinschaft not necessarily in terms of a radical restructuring of society involving fundamental social change, but more as an acceptable insurance policy against the alternative, Marxist-Leninism -or as an opportunity for self-advancement. According to Alf Liidtke, 'The vast majority of industrial workers tried to pursue their immediate interests by obtaining jobs and earning higher wages.'20 Workers quickly realized that the best opportunities for personal aggrandizement occurred when they could demonstrate how effectively they were 'working towards the "national community"'.
Reports from the Sopade, the Social Democrats' exile organization, reveal a mixed response to community propaganda and the nazis' social welfare measures. Workers were clearly aware of the many contradictions that existed. Reports show that social facilities like factory sports fields and swimming baths offered by DAF had some impact on working-class perceptions of the regime, yet at the same time workers complained that very often they were 'compelled to build these facilities in their spare time without pay'.21 The 'Beauty of Labour' was seen by many as simply a continuation of paternalistic German business practices and the vogue of the 1920s to increase productivity through modern 'scientific management' techniques. Similarly, for many workers, increased real wages could only be earned through large amounts of overtime. Sopade reported that this had an impact on productivity and on morale which in turn led to rising absenteeism and sickness rates. These boys join our organisation at the age of ten and get a breath of fresh air for the first time, then four years later, they move from the Jungvolk to the Hitler Youth and there we keep them for another four years. And then we are even less prepared to give them back into the hands of those who create class and status barriers, rather we take them immediately into the SA or into the SS.... And if they are there for eighteen months or two years and have still not become real National Socialists, then they go into the Labour Service and are polished there for six or seven months .... And if, after six or seven months, there are still remnants of class consciousness or pride in status, then the Wehrmacht will take over the further treatment for two years and when they return after two or four years then, to prevent them from slipping back into old habits once again we take them immediately into the SA, SS etc. and they will not be free again for the rest of their lives. 38 However, the belief that the Hitler Youth had successfully mobilized all young people is clearly an exaggeration. There is considerable evidence to suggest that by the late 1930s the regimental nature of the Hitler Youth was alienating some young people who were forming independent gangs. The two most documented 'non-conformist' groups (referred to by the Gestapo as 'wild cliques') who rejected the Hitler Youth, though for different reasons, were the 'Swing Youth' (Swing-Jugend) and the 'Edelweiss Pirates' (Edelweisspiraten).
The 'Swing Youth' were certainly not anti-fascist. They tended to be the offspring of the urban middle class with the money and status to reject volkisch music and listen instead to jazz and swing music which the authorities labelled American-influenced 'Unkultur' and later banned. The Hitler Youth reports were concerned less with what was invariably referred to as 'negro music' than with sexual promiscuity, lack of parental discipline and the general cult of 'sleaziness' that surrounded these groups. The 'Swing Youth' cultivated a somewhat elitist culture that rejected the strident nationalism of the 
